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CAN BUCKLEY CLEAR CUSTOMS?
HAROLD H. BR=F*
The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA)' and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)2 provide for panels of interna-
tional arbitrators to review countervailing duty and antidumping determi-
nations made by American administrators. Beause the panels displace judicial
review by American federal courts, their use presents two kinds of separation
of powers issues. First, must judicial review by Article III judges be
retained?3 Second, must review be performed by "Officers of the United
States" who are appointed in conformity with Article II of the Constitution? 4
Alan Morrison's articles focusing only on the second question, concludes
that the answer is "yes," because under Buckley v. Valeo,6 the FTA
arbitrators exercise "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States," and must therefore be officers of the United States, which they
are not. I believe that the two questions cannot be separated in this instance,
and that a negative answer to the first also compels a negative answer to
the second. Therefore, I conclude that the dispute resolution provisions of
the FTA, or the NAFTA, are constitutional.
A. THE PuRPosEs OF BUCKLEY
The holding of Buckley is that Congress may not grant itself the
appointments power for officers engaged in regulation of domestic political
campaigns. 7 As the Court pointed out, the Constitution allows the President,
* Rothschild Research Professor of Law, George Washington University. B.A. 1965,
Williams; J.D. 1968, Harvard.
1. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 293.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., available in
LEXIS, GENFED-EXTRA Database, WL, NAFTA Database (awaiting ratification as this
article went to press).
3. For my views on this and other issues concerning the constitutionality of the dispute
resolution mechanism of the FTA, see United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 101-18 (1988) (statement of
Prof. Harold H. BrufO.
4. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, el. 2. The Appointments Clause provides:
[The President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law;
but the Congress may by Law vest Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
Id.
5. Alan B. Morrison, Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolution Pro-
visions of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1299
(1992).
6. 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
7. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135 (1976).
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the Heads of Departments, and the Courts of Law to appoint officers, but
leaves out Congress.8 That the omission was not accidental is confirmed by
the Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses of Article I, Section 6, which
forbid members of Congress to serve simultaneously as executive officers,
or to create new or embellished offices and then serve in them. 9 If Congress
and the Executive were to be kept in the hands of separate personnel, as
the Framers surely intended, it would be almost as important to forbid
Congress to appoint executive officers as to forbid it to execute the laws
directly.' 0
Hence Buckley is that rarity in separation of powers jurisprudence, an
easy case. Here, if anywhere, the Court's recent focus on the presence or
absence of "aggrandizement"'-or "encroachment" or "disruption" or
whatever pejorative we wish to apply to action that impairs the balance of
power among the branches-justifies the conclusion that Congress was trying
to usurp one of the President's chief means of controlling the executive
branch.' 2 The force of the Court's reasoning surely justifies a general
principle that Congress may never seize the appointments power itself for
domestic administration of the laws.
Yet difficulties in assessing Buckley's reach speedily appear. Both ex-
ecutive officers and federal judges are "Officers of the United States" for
Appointments Clause purposes. Is there any difference between them for
these purposes? If not, administration of the laws could be allocated to
either federal judges or executive officers, but not to anyone else, such as
international arbitrators. The President, however, has a fundamentally dif-
ferent relationship to the two kinds of "Officers." He enjoys varying
degrees of supervisory authority over executives, and none over judges.
Buckley was decided in the context of "independent" executive officers,
who occupy a twilight zone between maximum presidential authority over
the Cabinet, and minimum authority over the judiciary. 3 The members of
the Federal Election Commission, like many administrators, performed not
only adjudicative functions that presumably could have been assigned to
federal judges, but rulemaking and enforcement functions that could not
have been assigned to the judiciary. The Court, avoiding the swamp of
discussing the extent of permissible presidential supervision over independent
agencies, did not say whether its preservation of the President's appointment
8. Id. at 125-27.
9. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
10. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 741-50 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (em-
phasizing that congressional agents must not make binding policy decisions).
11. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122 (discussing "aggrandizement" of one branch at expense of
another branch).
12. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381-83 (1989); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 693-95 (1988); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
850-57 (1986).
13. See generally Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative
Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1987).
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opportunity was meant to protect his supervisory role over execution as
well. For administration in the hands of ordinary executive agencies, the
power to appoint officers does carry" an implied power to supervise execu-
tion.
14
Nevertheless, it is generally understood that principles of due process
forbid political supervision of adjudication, whether it be placed in a court
or an .agency.t5 If appointment of adjudicators is not linked to the President's
needs to Supervise execution of the law, the interest of the Executive in
retaining appointment authority is markedly reduced. It is not eliminated,
however-there remains an interest in selecting adjudicative personnel, even
if their later activity cannot be supervised. This interest is present for both
executive adjudicators and federal judges, of course. As the nation has seen
in recent clashes over Supreme Court nominees, the President hopes to
obtaini appointment of persons who share his general political philosophy.
Hence, although the degree of presidential need to selict ekecutive officers
is greater than to select judges, it is difficult or impossible to identify a
point where Congress may permissibly disregard it. Perhaps, then, we should
read Buckley to state a sound and universal principle that all statutory
administration must be in the hands of constitutional officers, and no one
else. If so, some existing law will have to change, as I next discuss.
B. ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL LAW BY NON-OFFICERS (OR, DOES
BUCKLEY CROSS THE BELTWAY?)
Notwithstanding Buckley, significant portions of the administration of
federal law have always rested in the hands of persons not employed by
the federal government. The most prominent example, the litigation of
federal questions in state courts, may be a special exception stemming from
Our Federalism. So I lay it to one side, although it does embarrass any
literal reading of Buckley. The Court's approval of placing governmental
power in the hands of arbitrators and other private individuals does need
reconciliation with the Appointments Clause.
In two cases decided since Buckley, the Court has upheld the use of
arbitration in federal programs.' 6 The Court's focus was not on Buckley in
either case. In Schweiker v. McClure, 7 the Court allowed private arbitrators
to apply federal law in a portion of the Medicare program. The Court
inquired whether arbitration was consistent with due process,, and concluded
that the informality of arbitration is offset by its increased neutrality, so
that fairness is adequately ensured.' 8 Thus arbitral schemes, by focusing on
14. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (President "may properly
supervise and guide their construction of the statutes").
15. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d
952 (5th Cir. 1966).
16. See generally Harold H. Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitu-
tionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEX. L. REv. 441 (1989).
17. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
18. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196-200 (1982).
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practical means to ensure neutral deciders, promote a value that has long
been central to adjudication. This value competes with the President's
interest in selecting adjudicators who are sympathetic to the goals of the
executive. In the arbitration cases, the Court seems quietly to have decided
that neutrality can trump responsiveness. In Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Products Co., '9 the Court asked whether the arbitration of
disputes between manufacturers in the regulation of pesticides was consistent
with Article III. It concluded that relieving the overloaded courts of some
potential business could promote rather than undermine the purposes of
Article 111.20 The Court's judgments in both of these cases seem acceptable.
There is also a long-and very conflicted-line of cases concerning
delegations of power to private individuals to administer federal statutes. 2'
These schemes lack the institutional controls to ensure neutrality that typify
arbitration. The Supreme Court'has sometimes condemned the placement
of governmental power in the hands of interested private persons, and has
sometimes upheld it. For an example of the Court's toleration of the
practice, consider Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,22 in which the
Court held that consumers may not obtain judicial review of federal milk
marketing orders. To support its nonreviewability holding, the Court argued
that statutory provisions conditioning government orders on the consent of
milk producers showed that the scheme was designed to advantage the
producers. 3 The Court-did not pause to ask whether private interests should
be allowed to commandeer federal agencies-indeed, its holding facilitated
private control. Perhaps all the cases that uphold these delegations are
wrong under the Buckley principle. If so, the Court will have to survey a
better border between public and private power in America than anyone
has done to date.
C. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OF AMERICAN CLAIMS
From the earliest days of our Republic, international agreements have
subjected claims of Americans to international arbitration, with binding
effect on those claims. 24 The practice extends back to the controversial Jay
Treaty of 1794.2 Although there was much to dislike in the" Treaty, whose
terms were more or less imposed by the British, no one suggested that its
claims settlement feature was unconstitutional. 26 From the standpoint of
historical pedigree for a constitutional practice, it is hard to do much better
19. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
20. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590-91 (1985).
21. See Bruff, supra note 16, at 455-62; George W. Liebmann, Delegation to Private
Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650 (1975).
22. 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
23. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 346-47 (1984).
24. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 124, 142-58 (statement of Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld).
25. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat.
116.
26. See generally JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 1789-1801 164-71 (1960).
1312
CAN BUCKLEY CLEAR CUSTOMS?
than an agreement that was "negotiated" by a moonlighting Chief Justice,
swallowed by a reluctant President Washington, and accepted by one of
the earliest Senates. Claims settlement by international arbitration has been
a regular feature of our foreign policy ever since. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld it, most recently in Dames & Moore v. Regan,27 which
approved the transfer of claims pending in federal courts to an international
arbitral tribunal as part of the Iranian hostage settlement.
It is easy to see why the Court has allowed international arbitration,
without requiring that the arbitrators be officers of the United States. The
power to settle claims by arbitration is one needed by any nation, to remove
controversies that hamper foreign relations. For example, no resolution of
the Iranian crisis was likely to occur until a mechanism for settling out-
standing claims was devised. The claims settlement power is thus a com-
ponent of the foreign policy powers of the United States Government under
Articles I and II of the Constitution.
The Appointments Clause must be interpreted in a way that does not
impair the operation of other provisions of the Constitution. To extend the
operation of the Clause to international arbitration is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the purposes of this settlement device. It may be that the
American members of international panels regard themselves as our officers,
when they are selected by means arguably in compliance with the Appoint-
ments Clause, although that would be quite inconsistent with a neutral
adjudicative role. 21 In any event, the foreign members of the panels are not
our officers in any sense, and cannot be transmogrified into them. If all
members of a mixed panel of Iranians and Americans must be our officers
before arbitration may commence, there is little likelihood that any initial
agreement to use arbitration will occur, or that the process will remain the
truly international and balanced one that it must be to achieve success.
D. DoEs BUCKLEY CRoss NiAGARA FALS (AND THE Rio GRANDE)?
The FTA and the NAFTA fit comfortably within the traditions of
international arbitration. First, the subject matter of antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations is truly international. The facts of these
controversies concern the activities of foreign governments and firms within
their own borders: is a feature of the tax code a subsidy; is a pricing
practice explained by a protected environment?. Second, the law of dispute
settlement is also international. Today, a panel applies our federal law;
tomorrow, another applies Canadian law; under NAFTA, another will apply
Mexican law. All are equally part of the scheme, and it is artificial to focus
only on the portion of the disputes that apply our own law. Third, the
27. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
28. But see William J. Davey, The Appointments Clause and International Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms: A False Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1315, 1320 (1992) (stating
that Professor Davey did not feel that his panel position'was so "august" as to require Senate
confirmation).
1992]
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aggrandizement concern that lies at the heart of Buckley is not present here.
No international agreement containing an arbitral mechanism can be im-
posed on an unwilling executive. If the executive is not wholeheartedly in
favor of any international agreement, it is most unlikely to be reached at
all. This contrasts sharply with the frequency with which Congress has
forced a President to swallow a domestic statute containing a provision the
executive believes to be unconstitutional, for example a legislative veto. 29
Finally, within its appropriate sphere, Buckley is about administrative re-
sponsiveness to the President; international arbitration is about neutrality.
The twain should not be joined. Correctly understood, Buckley does not
clear customs.
29. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968-74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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